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Abstract
Social communication relies on intentional control of emotional expression. Its variability across cultures suggests important
roles for imitation in developing control over enactment of subtly different facial expressions and therefore skills in
emotional communication. Both empathy and the imitation of an emotionally communicative expression may rely on
a capacity to share both the experience of an emotion and the intention or motor plan associated with its expression.
Therefore, we predicted that facial imitation ability would correlate with empathic traits. We built arrays of visual stimuli by
systematically blending three basic emotional expressions in controlled proportions. Raters then assessed accuracy of
imitation by reconstructing the same arrays using photographs of participants’ attempts at imitations of the stimuli.
Accuracy was measured as the mean proximity of the participant photographs to the target stimuli in the array. Levels of
performance were high, and rating was highly reliable. More empathic participants, as measured by the empathy quotient
(EQ), were better facial imitators and, in particular, performed better on the more complex, blended stimuli. This preliminary
study offers a simple method for the measurement of facial imitation accuracy and supports the hypothesis that empathic
functioning may utilise motor control mechanisms which are also used for emotional expression.
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Introduction
Facial emotional expression was considered by Darwin [1] to be
universally constant and largely innate. Consequently, models
have been proposed [2,3] that describe the vast domain of
emotional expression in terms of interaction between typically six
‘‘basic’’ emotions. More contemporary perspectives appreciate
that one of the most distinctive qualities of human social
communication is that people utilise an extensive repertoire of
facial actions in a variable way across cultures to communicate
emotion in a flexible way according to its context [4,5]. For facial
expressions to be culturally shaped they need to be imitated [6],
suggesting that imitation plays an important role in their
development.
Imitation is distinguished from mimicry which has been studied
using electromyography [7], and involves the triggering or release
of a previously learnt motor program. Unlike imitation, mimicry
does not provide a mechanism to modify and expand the existing
repertoire of facial expressions. Imitation is characterised by
a capacity to enact an action from seeing someone else do it [8],
requiring a cognitive representation of how an action is performed
[9]. Therefore, whilst mimicry may utilise a shared experience of
emotion encoded as primary representations encoded in sensori-
motor systems [8–11] imitation also requires a secondary repre-
sentation in the form of an intention or motor plan for that same
action [12]. In this respect, facial imitation may draw upon similar
mechanisms to those serving empathy, which is also concerned
with both the communication of emotion and a secondary
representation of that emotion which enables understanding
[13]. This argument is closely tied to the simulation model of
empathy, which suggests that the empathiser may use his or her
neural systems for imitating actions ‘off-line’ to imagine and
understand the experiences of others [14,15], and the Perception-
Action model of empathy [16], which argues that empathy relies
upon the perception-action coupling mechanisms that we consider
necessary for imitation. These cognitive models of empathy
propose reliance on the ‘mirror neuron’ system [14,17,18] which
is also thought to be important for imitation [19].
Nevertheless, despite so much theoretical argument hypothesis-
ing a relationship between empathic traits and imitation ability
[14,15,16], supporting empirical evidence is limited [20]. Some
evidence comes from research in autism, where problems with
both empathy and imitation co-occur [21], and a poor repertoire
of facial expressions has diagnostic value [22,23]. This contrasts
with the art of acting which concerns itself with the effective
portrayal of complex mental states through subtle control over
actions. One reason for a lack of evidence may be that imitation of
emotionally communicative action has been relatively little
researched. Given that so much emotion is expressed through
facial action, this would principally concern research into facial
imitation. Much interest has been shown in neonatal imitation
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[24] but many argue that this is a non-specific response to social
interaction [25] or a primitive reflex [26]. Studies of facial
imitation in older populations utilising basic emotions [27–29] are
unlikely tests of empathy given that recognition of basic emotions
is categorical [30], and is achieved by one-year-olds [31]. If
empathy is a measure of the complexity of action planning or
understanding that underpins an emotional state, then a basic
expression will require only a basic level of empathy. For
previously learnt expressions, only recognition and then execution
of a behaviour pattern is required. Tasks involving novel
sequences or novel facial actions may offer stronger tests of
imitative ability [29,32,33] but seem unlikely measures of
emotional understanding.
We wished to test the hypothesis that the ability to imitate
plausibly emotionally communicative facial expressions would be
associated with empathic qualities. For this we required a measure
of imitation accuracy at distinct, non-arbitrary levels of imitation
difficulty. In the non-human primate literature, imitation is most
reliably tested using two-action methods [34]. Two-action
methods show each of two distinct approaches to solving the
same problem to separate, matched subject pools. Participants are
then observed solving the problem to see if they are more likely to
utilise the method demonstrated to them than the one demon-
strated to others. This approach therefore determines whether
individuals show imitation according to which of two possible
behaviours they saw. It therefore relies on whether discrimination
between two modelled alternative behaviours, is maintained when
that group of behaviours is copied. For this study, we sought to
adapt this method to ask how well, rather than if, people could
imitate by asking how different actions had to be from one another
before imitators could successfully show evidence of discriminating
between them in their copies. We assessed how closely a set of
imitated actions corresponded to a set of quantitatively related
modelled actions by systematically varying the actions in their
degree of similarity. This would establish the threshold at which
copies could no longer be discriminated from one another and so
provide a measure of imitation ability. This approach to facial
imitation required us to synthesise novel facial expression stimuli




Participants were typical adults recruited by word of mouth.
Written consent was obtained from volunteers before participa-
tion. The consent procedure and study as a whole was approved
by the Ethics Review Board of the College of Life Sciences and
Medicine of the University of Aberdeen. The experimental
programme was run in an HTML/JavaScript interface. Nine
men and 15 women participated after one female outlier with
particularly poor imitation (error score mean .3SD) was removed
from analysis (data normalised Shapiro-Wilk statistic = 0.950,
df = 24, p.0.267). These participants were aged between 16 and
26 years (mean= 21.0462.84[SD]). Men were slightly older than
women but not significantly so (male mean=22.4462.88[SD];
female mean= 20.262.54[SD]; t = 2.00, df = 22, p = 0.059). Em-
pathy quotient ranged from 13 to 64 (mean 38.1612.8[SD]) and
differences between sexes were not significant (male
mean= 33.8612.7[SD]; female mean= 40.7612.6[SD]; t = 1.31,
df = 22, p = 0.205). Distribution of EQ, age and imitation error
scores were all normally distributed according to inspection of data
and Shapiro-Wilk statistic (all p.0.189).
Materials
We created two stimulus arrays of composite-emotions, each
incorporating 15 facial stimuli arranged in the form of an
equilateral triangle (Figure 1). The vertices represent three (of
six) basic emotions, whilst the stimuli at intermediate positions
consist of blends of the basic emotions, thus making the emotional
content of the expression more ambiguous. The extremes were
caricatured to 110%, and the remaining stimuli were placed
recursively at midpoints, exaggerated to contain varying propor-
tions of the three basic emotions up to a constant cumulative
expression level of 110%, calculated as the Euclidean distance
from the neutral expression in x-y-z face space (where x-y-z are
three perpendicular axes representing the three basic emotions).
Thus, all stimuli in the array were arranged along a spherical
surface (with radius r = 110%) in x-y-z face space, centred on the
neutral expression. The allocation of emotions to the two triangles
was based on the FEEST Hexagon (Facial Expression of Emotion:
Stimuli and Tests), which arranges the six basic emotions on the
points of a hexagon such that more confusable expressions are
adjacent to one another. This served to maximise contrast between
opposing emotions in each triangle. The triangles consisted of:
Sadness-Anger-Surprise (SAS) and Fear-Happiness-Disgust
(FHD).
Facial stimuli were derived from the ‘JJ’ set [35] of seven
greyscale photographs – one for each single emotion and one
neutral expression. Image transformation techniques were used
whereby image shape and lightness were warped to express
varying proportions of the difference between the neutral image
(N) and the emotion image (Ei), where shape difference is





The relative percentage contribution of each shape transform
to each stimulus within the array was then determined by
translating its position within the array to a vector located on
a three-dimensional spherical surface with each axis representing
a single emotion and the x,y,z coordinates of the central point
being a completely neutral expression at (0,0,0) (Figure 2). The
singular emotions (i.e. purely fear, purely anger) were slightly
caricatured, taken to 110% of the original expression. Using
these techniques, we created two arrays of synthetic emotional
stimuli, where each emotion was expressed proportionally to its
inverse-distance in the array from the location where it was
most expressed.
Procedure
Participants were seated in front of a computer and asked to
imitate the displayed stimuli. After a training block of five images
(comprising three basic emotion vertices, the neutral expression,
and one composite emotion), each stimulus from both arrays of 15
images was shown once, in three blocks of 10 images, each to
constitute a ‘run’. No two adjacent images from the same array
were in the same block, and hence the blocks were balanced with
respect to content of vertex (basic emotion) and compound
expressions. Within each block, images alternated between the two
arrays; otherwise the order of the images and blocks was
randomised. For each trial, a fixation cross was followed by the
Imitation of Composite Emotional Expression
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image for 10 seconds, after which a sound clip counted 3–2–1, and
a photograph was taken; then the next image appeared. A webcam
(Logitech HD C310) mounted on the top of the screen was used
for photocapture. The run was then repeated. Participants were
randomly allocated to receive visual feedback from the webcam,
i.e., a real-time view of themselves, on either the first or second
run, with the relevant part of the screen being masked in the
remaining run. Therefore, each participant imitated each image
Figure 1. Array of emotional stimuli generated arranged in a triangle to show patterns of continuous variation. This image was
created from photographs of ‘JJ’ [36], original image is Paul Ekman, reproduced with permission.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0061941.g001
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four times. Half the participants received visual feedback during
the first half of the experiment and half received it during the
second half. In addition, participants completed the empathy
quotient (EQ); which is a 60-item self-report questionnaire that
can reliably differentiate participants according to empathic traits
[13].
Scoring
One researcher printed the photocaptured attempts at imitation
and noted on the back of each the position in the array of the
corresponding stimulus. A second researcher, blind to the correct
source image, judged the position in the array for each response
that they thought had served as the model. The scorer could not
select a position already occupied without moving the response
already occupying that position. Once the scorer was satisfied that
he or she had achieved the arrangement of responses that best
matched the stimulus array, the arrangement was unblinded and
scored. A score of ‘0’ was allocated to every image placed in the
correct position. Otherwise the score reflected the distance
between the placement and the correct position, counted
according to the minimum number of steps between the erroneous
and the correct positions on the triangle. Therefore, the highest
score that could be gained for a single image was 4, since no two
points on the triangular array are more than four steps apart. Each
participant was scored twice, to improve reliability. A sample of
scores for 16 sets of triangular arrays were rated by both raters.
Results
The mean total error score for an individual was 3.97 steps per
array of 15 stimuli and 0.265 for each item (34.6% of trials were
scored as being correct and a further 49.9% were within 1 step of
being correct). This score is substantially higher than would be
expected for an error rate from random performance (2.200+/
20.982).
Effects of EQ and visual feedback were investigated with
a repeated measures ANOVA. EQ scores were categorised into
High or Low scores according to whether they were above or
below the median score (low,44). Within-participant factors were
the arrays of emotions (two levels) and Block (two levels). High/
Low EQ, task order (visual feedback provided during first or
second block) and sex were included as a between participant
factors and age was included as a covariate. This revealed a main
between-subject effect of EQ (F(1, 15) = 7.79, p= 0.014,
g2 = 0.342. There were trends towards significant interactions
between task order and sex (F(1, 15) = 3.87, p= 0.068, g2 = 0.205)
and task order and High/Low EQ (F(1, 15) = 3.38, p = 0.086,
g2 = 0.184) but no other main effects or interactions were
significant or close to significant (all F,3, p.0.1).
To explore the relationship between EQ and emotion array
more closely, we examined correlations between EQ and error
scores for the two emotion arrays separately and combined. EQ
correlated negatively with the combined error score (Pearson
r =20.420, p= 0.041, n= 24) and separately, EQ correlated
negatively with the error score for the SAS array (r =20.500,
p = 0.013, n= 24) but not with the FHD array (r =20.253,
p = 0.234, n= 24) (Figure 3). These correlations were not found to
be significantly different from one another using a Fisher’s z-test
(z =21.33, p= 0.18). It may be that the difference between the
arrays is related to task difficulty. A paired t-test showed worse
performance on the SAS array than the FHD array (SAS mean
error = 10.3564.23[SD]; FHD mean error = 8.8363.50;
t =22.44, df = 23, p = 0.023).
The inter-rater comparison revealed a high level of relative
agreement (n = 25, r = 0.925 p,0.001) and a slope close to 1 (line
equation: y = 0.829x+1.398), indicating high absolute agreement.
Discussion
We developed a novel method for measuring facial imitation
that relies on the imitators’ capacity to make their expressions
distinct from the other expressions in the set to be copied. In
contrast to previous studies of imitation, our task sought to place
demands on participants’ capacity for intentional control over
their facial expression. Participants showed clear evidence of their
ability to accurately imitate a range of emotional expressions,
obtaining error scores that were significantly lower than chance
level. Indeed, given the degree of similarity between adjacent
stimuli, imitators performed remarkably well, and over 80% of
ratings were correct within one step.
It might be asked whether participants achieved performance
on the task through imitation or some other means. One objection
may be that we cannot be sure that the expressions were novel to
the participants, although novelty is a problematic criterion to use
in defining imitation [38]. Also, could participants have used
verbal labels to quantify the amount of emotion in each
photograph? There are several reasons why this is unlikely. First,
emotional attribution tends to be categorical [30] and the
composite images of multiple emotions do not necessarily reflect
any naturally occurring emotional state. Second, photographs
were presented singly, each consisting of a blend of three emotions
and shown alternately with the alternative blend of emotions.
Therefore, to complete the task verbally would require partici-
pants to assign correct numerical values to the components
involved and then to apply them in their pattern of expression.
Close scrutiny of Figure 1 shows strong similarity of adjacent
expressions and verbal description of these differences would be
Figure 2. Array of points on surface of a sphere with distance
from vertex determining relative proportions of emotion in
each blend.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0061941.g002
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challenging. Even if it were the case that participants were using
verbal labels to assist with imitation, this does not preclude it from
being imitation. As discussed above, this experiment was designed
drawing on the two-way method which has been established as the
best experimental approach to testing for imitation, by de-
termining whether participants show evidence of discriminating
between two similar demonstrations of actions by showing
a corresponding pattern of discrimination in their efforts to re-
enact those actions. The task used here differed from mimicry by
placing demands on the ability to control facial action in-
tentionally, consistent with the definition of imitation of ‘‘perform-
ing an action by seeing how it is done’’ [8].
We hypothesised that an association would exist between
empathy and imitation because both abilities would correlate with
intentional control and motor planning capacity required for the
expression of emotion, and since our accuracy measure relied on
a capacity to form slightly different motor plans for slightly
different emotional states, it provided a measure of this ability. It
has been argued at least since Piaget [9] that imitation is
distinguished from simpler sensory-motor integration by the use of
representational mechanisms. Here, facial imitation required the
formation of ‘secondary representations’ of actions [10,39] in the
form of motor plans that express emotional states. In simulation
models of empathy [12,17,18], such models of emotional
expression would be used for emotional understanding and may
be formed by mapping codings for perceived actions onto motor
planning systems involving mirror neuron mechanisms. Recent
models of empathy have drawn a distinction between an approach
relying on action-simulation using these mechanisms, and in-
ferential approaches to mental state understanding [40–42]. Our
findings would suggest that the EQ is sensitive to individual
variability in the action-simulation aspects of empathic function.
Nevertheless, other explanations for the association remain to be
considered. It might also be suggested that the correlation with
empathy stems from a greater ability to recognise emotion, rather
than to imitate it. Research reports a weak relationship between
empathy and emotion recognition. Groups of subjects known to
have reduced empathy have also been shown to have reduced
ability to recognise emotion, particularly in the ‘mind in the eyes
task’ [43]. This includes sex-offenders [44] and those with autism
[45], although, in this latter group the deficit may be subtle [46] or
showing only a trend after controlling for IQ [47]. It has been
suggested that this relationship could be mediated by alexithymia
[48] which itself is also associated with low EQ scores [49]. We
were able to identify only one recent study [50] that reported
direct examination of the relationship between facial emotion
recognition and EQ in a typical population. Fear was the only
emotion where recognition correlated significantly with EQ scores,
and then only with an eta-squared value of 0.11 (n= 135
participants), indicative of a small effect. In our study we found
a stronger relationship with EQ and then with an emotion array
that did not include fear. Of further interest is that the empathy
relationship reported by Besel and Yuille only occurred at long
(2 s) and not at brief (50 ms) exposures, which they suggest could
be due to the role of more ‘cognitive’ as opposed to ‘automatic’
processes. Such ‘cognitive’ processes may perhaps be concerned
with mental state representation that also occurs during imitation
or intentional control over emotional expression. Therefore, it
seems unlikely that recognition processes could solely account for
the correlation in our experiment. Nevertheless, future work would
benefit from an emotion recognition control task and attempts
being made to distil the relative contributions of recognition,
naming and re-enactment to the association between empathy and
imitation. A final possibility to consider is that the association may
have been mediated by a desire to please the experimenter. This
could reflect variations in social motivation between individuals.
This may also be a subject for examination in future studies.
It was interesting that we found little effect of visual feedback or
practice in our study. Even combined, these two influences did not
have a significant effect. The lack of these influences may relate to
the likelihood that most people do not practise facial expressions in
daily life, whether with or without mirrors (at least, not that we
know of). Alternatively it may be that the study design was too
brief to allow practice effects to emerge.
Our method had good inter-rater reliability, which is reassuring
given that the rating stage could potentially provide a major source
of variability. Whilst participants had many degrees of freedom in
their generation of responses, raters’ choices were more limited
through being required to fit the responses to the limited locations
in the matrix. Raters also had plenty of time to decide where to
Figure 3. Scatter plots showing relationship between empathy quotient and imitation ability.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0061941.g003
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allocate responses and quickly gained experience through repeti-
tion, enabling them to become sensitive to subtle differences
between facial expressions.
In summary, the relationship between imitation and empathy
could feasibly be mediated by one of, or a combination of several
mechanisms that could all improve the mapping of a perceived
action more accurately onto the motor plan for the same action.
These may include action-perception mapping, secondary repre-
sentation, heightened perception, verbal labelling, or social
motivation. Further research will be required to explore these
possibilities.
Despite the encouraging findings of this study, we would
emphasise their preliminary nature. Most importantly, we report
a novel experimental method developed to find a relatively simple
and practical way of measuring facial imitation ability in an
objective and reliable manner. Our method proved to be reliable
and effective in distinguishing between participants according to
their self-reported empathy which provided some evidence for our
new method’s validity.
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